The Russian Revolution: Red
October and the Bolshevik Coup (2)
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People do not make revolutions eagerly any more than they do war.
There is this difference, however, that in war
compulsion plays the decisive role, in revolution there is no compulsion
except that of circumstances. A revolution takes place only when there is no
other way out. And the insurrection, which rises above a revolution like a
peak in the mountain chain of its events, can be no more evoked at will than
the revolution as a whole. The masses advance and retreat several times
before they make up their minds to the final assault. ---Trotsky, The History of the
Russian Revolution Damp winds blew off the Leon Trotsky,
the "famous leader of the bandits and the hooligans," caused a
sensation at the pre-parliament. He openly accused the government and the
bourgeoisie of encouraging the "bony hand of hunger," to strangle
the revolution. He said they were preparing to surrender the capital as part
of a government conspiracy. Such a statement drew shouts from the right,
shouts about Germans, sealed trains and the cry of "Bastard!" Then
he and all the Bolsheviks walked out of the meeting. Sukhanov
thought that they were "now taking up arms against the entire old
world." In "ruined, half-wild, petty bourgeois, economically
shattered" Russia, this small party was trying to create an unheard of
proletarian state and a new society. They had "put an end to the united
front of the democracy for ever." Civil war would surely follow. The
lust for blood fueled by class hatred was strong. Manors and country estates
were burning. Members of the ancien régime were
being casually murdered by the mob. In a village near Essential to a successful Bolshevik takeover was deception. And it was
Leon Trotsky who was brilliant in formulating its tactics. The country was in
no mood for a single party power. An uprising carried out under the slogan of
the Soviet, Trotsky realized, was "something quite different." So,
"whilst moving forward all along the line," he later explained,
"we maintained an appearance of defensiveness." He could not do
this with a properly convened Soviet Congress. There was not the slightest
chance of a Bolshevik victory in a national Soviet election so the existing
Congress was illegally packed with Bolsheviks. The decision to mount the coup was taken on October 10th. Lenin had returned
to Around three in the morning, Lenin picked up a child's ruled tablet and
wrote the following resolution: "recognizing…that an armed uprising is
inevitable and that its time has come, the Central Committee suggests that
all party organizations be guided by this." The exhausted committee
members ended the meeting, ate a light breakfast, and then left Sukhanov's flat to spread the word: Now was the time to
seize power! However, the Twelve were not the only individuals with knowledge of the
coup. The newspapers had been talking about it for days. When the Cabinet met
on October 16th, there was no sense of alarm. They had simply assumed that a
coup was unlikely since by that time, any sense of surprise had been lost.
Lenin was exhausted. He dropped his wig in the mud on his way to the Finland
Station and it had to be cleaned. He never got the hang of wearing it.
"He kept trying to straighten it," said his Bolshevik landlady,
Margarita Fofanova. Needless to say, Lenin was a
very nervous man. Sukhanov thought that Lenin's
ideas -- the smashing of the credit system, the seizure of banks, parity of
wages, and workers' control -- were "so disproportionately few in
comparison with the immensity of the tasks, and so unknown to anyone outside
the Bolshevik Party, that you might say they were completely
irrelevant." Maxim Gorky described the plotters of the coup as
"crazed fanatics." On October 22nd, the commissar for the western front cabled a message to Kerensky that said: "There is nothing left but to
give up. Disintegration has attained its limit." The newspaper Russkiye Vedomosti apologized
to its readers that it could run only a fraction of the stories about
mutinies and pogroms that flooded its newsroom each day. In By mid-morning, Bolshevik troops retook the newspaper offices without a
struggle. The molds were repaired and the papers began to pour off the
presses once again. Kerensky cabled the front for
additional armed forces but he hoped he would not have to use them. He had at
his disposal, 200 cadets, 200 women soldiers and 134 unattached officers for
policing duties. Trotsky was at the Smolny
Institute, the former home of a finishing school for aristocratic girls,
but now used as the general headquarters for the Bolshevik Party and the
Petrograd Soviet. A delegation from the Not so Lenin. He spent the better part of the evening pacing the floor of
his hideaway apartment. He couldn't stand the slow pace of events, the
indecision in both Smolny and the Comrades! I am writing these lines on the evening of the 6th. The situation is
extremely critical. It is as clear as can be that delaying the uprising now
really means death. With all my power I wish to persuade the comrades that now everything
hangs on a hair, that on the order of the day are questions that are not solved
by conferences, by congresses (even by Congresses of Soviets), but only by
the people, by the masses, by the struggle of armed masses. The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovists,
the removal of Verkhovsky, show that we must not
wait. We must at any price, this evening, to-night, arrest the Ministers,
having disarmed (defeated if they offer resistance) the military cadets, etc.
We must not wait! We may lose everything! The immediate gain from the seizure of power at present is: defense of
the people (not the congress, but the people, in the first place, the army
and the peasants) against the Kornilovist
government which has driven out Verkhovsky and has
hatched a second Kornilov plot. Who should seize power? At present this is not important. Let the Military Revolutionary
Committee seize it, or "some other institution" which declares that
it will relinquish the power only to the real representatives of the
interests of the people, the interests of the Army (immediate offer of
peace), the interests of the peasants (take the land immediately, abolish
private property), the interests of the hungry. It is necessary that all the boroughs, all regiments, all forces
should be mobilised and should immediately send
delegations to the Military Revolutionary Committee, to the Central Committee
of the Bolsheviks, insistently demanding that under no circumstances is power
to be left in the hands of Kerensky and Co. Until
the 7th, by no means! -- but that the matter must
absolutely be decided this evening or to-night. History will not forgive delay by revolutionists who could be
victorious to-day (and will surely be victorious to-day), while they risk
losing much to-morrow, they risk losing all. If we seize power to-day, we seize it not against the Soviets but for
them. Seizure of power is the point of the uprising; its political task will
be clarified after the seizure. It would be a disaster or formalism to wait for the uncertain voting
of November 7. The people have a right and a duty to decide such questions
not by voting but by force; the people have a right and duty in critical
moments of a revolution to give directions to their representatives, even
their best representatives, and not to wait for them. This has been proven by the history of all revolutions, and the crime
of revolutionists would be limitless if they let go the proper moment,
knowing that upon them depends the saving of the revolution, the offer of
peace, the saving of Petrograd, the saving from starvation, the transfer of
the land to the peasants. The government is tottering. We must deal it the death blow at any
cost. To delay action is the same as death. If this letter showed anything, it was the total lack of coordination
between Lenin and the Central Committee. It also showed Lenin's deep distrust
of the revolutionary inclinations of his colleagues. Would the proposed coup
actually take place? By Small groups of Bolshevik troops moved out of their barracks in the early
hours of Wednesday, October 25th. They were visibly relieved at the general
lack of resistance. They took the Government ministers arrived at the The siege of the As it turned out, the coup did not interfere with the evening life of the
city. The ministers in the The women's detachment loyal to Kerensky,
declaring that its function was to fight Germans, left the Palace. At At COMMENTS AND REFLECTIONS ON 1917
This so-called October Revolution was an "armed insurrection"
carried out by the Bolshevik Party using the apparatus of the Petrograd
Soviet. Lenin insisted that the transfer of power from the Provisional
Government to the Bolsheviks take this militarized form rather than
the political form of a vote by the forthcoming All-Russian Congress of
Soviets, an approach favored by Zinoviev and Kamenev. Lenin did this because he believed, as did Marx,
that the class struggle was class warfare and so necessarily involved
physical violence. No other method could demonstrate where the real power
lay. In the same manner, Lenin understood the literal meaning of Marx's call
to "expropriate the expropriators" by urging the masses to
"steal the stolen." This was no violation of Marx's view of the
logic of history -- armed coercion was always integral to that logic. And so,
the October coup set the precedent for the continuing use of coercion by the
Party through all the stages required to construct socialism. From his refuge in In other words, this Revolution was a minority military action, not a mass
event like the one that occurred in February, or in 1905, for that matter. To
be more precise, what did occur was an amateur police operation of the
Military Revolutionary Committee, some sailors of the Baltic fleet and a
handful of Red Guards to take over the nerve-centers of the capital on the
night of October 24th. The Thus the strategy that Lenin had embraced in his APRIL
THESES paid off in the October seizure of power. Lenin, the Bolshevik
leader, hitherto unknown to most Russians as well as the outside world,
suddenly found himself the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of
the Our sense of wonder at the Bolshevik victory has lingered in the
historiography ever since, where it has produced problems of interpretation
The problem arises from the facts. First, that the Bolshevik Party was
largely Lenin's personal creation and second, that his personal insistence on
armed insurrection was the driving force which led up to the October coup.
However, does all this mean that without Lenin there would have been no Red
October and hence no Soviet regime? This rather extreme version of the "great man" theory has often
been advanced. Even Trotsky, though committed as a Marxist to the social
logic of history, comes close to holding Lenin indispensable to Bolshevik
victory. Trotsky may have wished to be more cautious. The events of 1917 --
from Order Number One in February to the emergence of the Left SRs in October -- show that even without Lenin there was
ample room on the Russian Left for an extremist party of "revolution
now." Consider that statement carefully. Before October it was the case
that Lenin's Party, although the most hierarchical of all the Russian
parties, was not as yet the monolithic instrument commanded at will by its
leader that it later became. Indeed, Trotsky's own historical role belies the overriding importance he
attributed to Lenin. In addition, Trotsky's role also points to the fluidity
of the Party in 1917. After all, Trotsky abandoned the Mensheviks only in
June 1917. And in October, it was Trotsky who was directing the Bolshevik
seizure of power. Go figure! He even countermanded Lenin's impatient directives
in order to coordinate the Party takeover with the Congress of Soviets, so as
to enhance the coup's "proletarian" appearance. Lenin, for all the
impetus he gave to the coup, had nothing to do with carrying it out, since he
was still in hiding when it began. Where Lenin was more than truly
indispensable was in his role, over the previous fourteen years, as architect
of the Party organization. However, even in this domain, by 1917, there were
numerous little Lenin's who could have pursued the same maximalist
policies. The maximalist strategy that Lenin worked out in
the April Theses would work only in the exceptional social
circumstances that the war had by 1917 created in The dynamic of national disintegration began with the
army and was driven throughout the year above all by the war. The policy of
the Provisional Government was to prosecute the war to a victorious
conclusion at the side of its democratic allies. The policy of the Soviet was
to fight only for a "democratic peace without annexations or
indemnities." Once discipline had been restored after the work of Order
Number One, the liberal-socialist coalition government formed in April
adopted a compromise war policy. As a result, Kerensky's
democratic offensive was launched in June. This offensive, of course, ended
in nothing less than a rout. Army discipline was once again undermined and
fueled the Bolshevik thrust of the July Days. And that event in turn led to General Kornilov's attempt in August to restore In the course of 1917 all of old Russia's structures -- the state, the
army, the Empire, the local administration, the economy and both the urban
and rural societies -- came apart simultaneously. Such a situation explains
why, amidst a state of generalized collapse, that there was no chance of
establishing a durable constitutional democracy. History militated against
it. Any government that would have tried to intervene against this
revolutionary process before its full unwinding would have been discredited.
Even if the Provisional Government had found the resolve to immediately
convene a Constituent Assembly, to unilaterally take Russia out of the war,
and to give the land to the peasants, this would have hardly had the desired
result. These were measures that critics later felt the Provisional
Government should have adopted in order to stop Bolshevism. These measures
were also, in fact, similar to Bolshevik policy. They would have been
revolutionary and disruptive in their effect, and they would have only
deepened the anarchy without giving the Provisional Government the new
coercive means to master it -- means that came quite naturally to the
Bolsheviks. The fact of the matter is that in 1917 the impetus for disintegration was
such that, once it had played itself out, only an authoritarian, coercive
solution was possible for creating some new type or order. As the historian
and leader of the Kadet Party Paul Miliukov put the matter, by the end of the summer the
alternatives for Russia were either Kornilov or
Lenin. But since Kornilov and the forces of the
traditional order that he symbolized had no real power, only Lenin and the
Bolsheviks were in a position to pick up the pieces and to fashion a new type
of order once the storm had spent its force. This new type of order would be the "dictatorship of the
proletariat" proclaimed after October as the vehicle for the transition
from capitalism to socialism. Drawing on Marx's analysis of the Paris Commune, during the
summer of 1917 in his book State
and Revolution, Lenin had interpreted the direct proletarian
democracy of the workers' soviets as the realization of a new
"commune" state. As such, the soviets constituted the basis of the
coming dictatorship and the new socialist state. Thus, although it is only
amidst a general process of national disintegration that the Russian workers'
movement could have acquired "world-historical" significance, this
broader process indeed received its political and ideological meaning from
working-class action or, at the very least, from action in the name of the
working class. It is for this reason that interpretation of the Russian Revolution both
in the East and in the West, has been overwhelmingly
concerned with the working class in relation to the Bolshevik Party. This
question is urgent because whatever legitimacy the Soviet regime could once
claim, in its own view, depended on the ideological conformity of the
proletariat with the Party and hence, on the socialist authenticity of
October. How then to explain the coming to power of the proletariat in
October 1917? In fact, the proletariat did not come to power. What came to
power was a political and ideological organization, the Bolshevik Party. Yet,
the historical myth surrounding Red October, is that
of a "revolution from below." A revolution led by the Russian
masses in the interests of the Russian masses. But our narrative
of the events of October have shown how nearly absent the working
classes of The myth of proletarian October is the myth of the triumph of the
alienated and dehumanized masses over all their sufferings and deprivations.
In this historically logical process, suffering is the criteria of authentic
humanity. This was as true for Marx as it was for Dostoevsky. And since
intense crisis makes suffering most acute, the war and the social collapse of
1917 conferred on the humiliated and offended of Russian life quintessential
human status. For the suffering of 1917 was no myth, but a most cruel,
physical and mental fact. In these circumstances, the modest Russian
proletariat could indeed appear in the eyes of its self-appointed leaders,
and in the eyes of many socialists throughout the world, to be the universal
class and the bearer of the logic of history. Thus this myth became a mighty
empirical force, the indispensable launching pad of the whole Soviet dream. Incipit vita nova. Here begins the new life. |